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Assets, Costs, and Affordability:
Why MAGI-Based Medicaid Benefits
Don’t Account for True Need
Note by Sara K. Hunkler*

Introduction
Meet Mary and Bob, both Medicaid applicants in 2013. Mary has a
house worth $1,000,000,1 a gain of $250,000 on the sale of a primary residence,2
an academic scholarship worth $150,000,3 stock with a current market value of
$60,000,4 a car worth $18,000,5 and cash assets of $600,000.6 She recently received
a gift of $150,000.7 Mary also has an income of $15,000 in 2013. Bob, by contrast,
makes $16,000 in 2013, has no positive assets, and owes student loan debt of
$10,000. Which person should qualify for federal health care assistance in 2014?
* J.D. Candidate, Indiana University Maurer School of Law, Class of 2015. I am grateful to
Sam Hunkler, Professor Jody Madeira, Kellen Ressmeyer, and Carl Oberdier for their insightful
feedback on my ideas, and to the editors of the Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality for
their helpful advice and comments on my drafts. I am particularly grateful to Conor Dirks for
his unwavering moral support throughout this process, and all others.
1. See I.R.C. § 61 (2012) (excluding from gross income unconverted assets, including real
estate); Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (as amended in 2007) (“[G]ain or loss realized from the
conversion of property into cash . . . is treated as income or as loss sustained.”).
2. See I.R.C. § 121(a) (2012) (excluding from gross income gain from sale of principal
residence in many cases); Treas. Reg. § 1.121-1(a)(2) (as amended in 2002).
3. See I.R.C. § 117 (2012) (excluding from gross income “any amount received as a qualified scholarship”).
4. See sources cited supra note 1 (excluding from gross income unconverted assets, including stock).
5. See id. (excluding from gross income unconverted assets, including cars).
6. See I.R.C. § 61 (excluding cash assets from gross income).
7. See I.R.C. § 102 (2012) (excluding from gross income “the value of property acquired
by gift”).
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According the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA),8 the
answer is Mary.
This Note examines current eligibility standards for Medicaid under the
PPACA, arguing that these income-based eligibility standards do not adequately
reflect an individual’s need for federal assistance because they neglect to consider
an individual’s assets, debts, and the circumstantial cost of his or her health care.
Assets, debts, and health care costs should be standard considerations in Medicaid
eligibility requirements to ensure the fair prioritization of individuals for whom
health coverage is least affordable and who thus have the greatest need for federal
assistance. In this Note, I will examine the implications of excluding assets,
debts, and health care costs from Medicaid eligibility determinations, propose
related modifications to the Medicaid eligibility standards mandated by the
PPACA, and compare Medicaid with similar government benefit programs with
eligibility calculation schemes that more adequately assess individual need. This
problem invites further discussion of the interplay between waste, inefficiency, and
administration under the PPACA.
Part I of this Note begins with an introduction to the Medicaid system and
discusses how it has been affected by the Medicaid coverage expansion introduced
by the PPACA, which was passed with the intention of extending affordable
medical coverage to all U.S. citizens.9 The PPACA preempts the states’ authority
to determine Medicaid eligibility requirements by imposing universal federally
mandated eligibility standards. Part II of this Note examines how the new federal
standards permit significant disparities in the treatment of similarly situated
impoverished individuals and allow prioritization of asset-wealthy individuals over
their more needy counterparts, a social injustice that contradicts the access and
affordability goals the PPACA strives to achieve. It argues that Medicaid eligibility
should work as a phaseout rather than a cliff cutoff and that Medicaid eligibility
standards under the PPACA should be redefined to focus on holistic wealth in
order to achieve fairer determinations of affordability and eligibility. Part III of this
Note concludes by examining need-calculation methodologies from other federal
social benefit programs that may offer fairer methodologies for Medicaid eligibility
calculation, and by proposing an analogous eligibility system for Medicaid that
considers assets, debts, and health care costs.
8. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010),
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124
Stat. 1029.
9. Aliens who are “lawfully present” in the United States are also subject to the health
insurance mandate, are eligible for premium credits and cost-sharing subsidies, and are potentially eligible to participate in the high-risk pools and the exchanges. Alison Siskin, Cong.
Research Serv., R41714, Summary of Treatment of Noncitizens Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (2011).
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The Medicaid Program and PPACA Expansion

Medicaid is a federal health care entitlement program that was enacted in
1965.10 A keystone of the Johnson administration’s “War on Poverty,” the Medicaid
program “reflects a fundamental concern about the health and wellbeing of the
disadvantaged.”11 Medicaid services traditionally benefit diverse populations and
“compared to both Medicare and employer-sponsored health care plans, offer[]
the broadest array of medical care and related services available in the United
States today.”12 Even prior to expansion under the PPACA, the number of
Medicaid enrollees had swelled to an estimated sixty-eight million, and combined
federal-state funding for that population topped $400 billion in fiscal year 2010.13
Participation in the Medicaid program is optional for states but brings substantial
federal funds.14 If states participate, as all fifty states currently do, they must follow
federally mandated rules to reap the benefits of this shared funding.15 Medicaid
is purchased by state and federal governments and requires no premium payment
from the beneficiary in most cases.16
The federal rules regarding Medicaid require that certain groups be covered,
but prior to the enactment of the PPACA, states were permitted to adjust key
program parameters.17 Traditionally, an individual must satisfy five different areas
of eligibility requirements to qualify for Medicaid assistance: categorical, income,
resources, immigration status, and residency.18 While the federal rules required
coverage of certain limited groups pre-PPACA, states retained fairly broad liberty
to exclude certain other groups at their will; apply exemptions reducing countable
income; and adjust eligibility, benefits, and enrollment.19 These liberties have been
curtailed under the recent Medicaid expansion mandated by the PPACA.
10. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396–1396w-5 (2012)).
11. John D. Blum & Gayland O. Hethcoat II, Medicaid Governance in the Wake of National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius: Finding Federalism’s Middle Pathway, from
Administrative Law to State Compacts, 45 J. Marshall L. Rev. 601, 610 (2012).
12. Elicia J. Herz, Cong. Research Serv., RL33202, Medicaid: A Primer 11 (2010).
13. Medicaid & CHIP Payment & Access Comm’n, Report to the Congress on Medicaid
and CHIP 27, 38 (2011).
14. See id. at 38.
15. Id. at 40.
16. Herz, supra note 12, at 7.
17. See id. at 1–5.
18. Vernon K. Smith & Eileen Ellis, Health Mgmt. Assocs., Christina Chang, Kaiser
Comm’n on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Eliminating the Medicaid Asset Test for Families: A Review of State Experiences 2 (2001), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.
com/2001/04/2239-eliminating-the-medicaid-asset-test.pdf.
19. See Herz, supra note 12, at 1–5.
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The PPACA was enacted in March 201020 and uses a variety of economic
and tax measures to impose rules and responsibilities upon the federal and state
governments, insurers, employers, and individuals in order to reform and improve
the availability, quality, and affordability of U.S. health insurance coverage.21
Almost immediately, the PPACA became colloquially known as “Obamacare” for
the President who signed it into law.22 As enumerated by the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS), the PPACA’s objectives are to (1) make coverage
more secure for those who have health insurance and extend it to the uninsured,
(2) improve health care quality and patient safety, (3) strengthen primary and
preventive care, (4) reduce health care costs, (5) better serve vulnerable populations,
and (6) encourage the “meaningful use” of health information technologies.23 Two
key provisions within the PPACA meant to facilitate aggressive achievement of
these goals are the individual mandate and the Medicaid expansion.24 The Medicaid
expansion increases the scope of the Medicaid program by requiring all state
programs to provide Medicaid coverage to adults with incomes up to 133% of the
federal poverty level (FPL).25 The expansion is estimated to make an additional
seventeen million currently uninsured, nonelderly adults eligible for Medicaid
based on the PPACA’s income and citizenship criteria for eligibility.26
Although these new eligibility standards were intended to apply uniformly
across all states, the Medicaid expansion is now effectively a state choice after
the Supreme Court addressed the PPACA’s constitutionality in June 2012 in
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.27 Twenty-six states, along
with private individuals and independent business organizations, challenged the
constitutionality of the PPACA’s individual mandate and Medicaid expansion in
20. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, Obama Signs Health Care Overhaul Bill, with
a Flourish, N.Y. Times (Mar. 23, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/health/
policy/24health.html?_r=0.
21. Questions and Answers on the Individual Shared Responsibility Provision, IRS, http://
www.irs.gov/uac/Questions-and-Answers-on-the-Individual-Shared-Responsibility-Provision
(Sept. 26, 2014).
22. James Hamblin, What is Obamacare?, Atlantic (Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.
com/health/archive/2013/04/what-is-obamacare/274509/.
23. Blum & Hethcoat, supra note 11, at 605 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2010–2015, http://www.hhs.gov/secretary/about/stratplan_
fy2010-15.pdf).
24. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012).
25. Id. at 2582; Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Focus on Health Reform: Summary of the
Affordable Care Act 1 (2013) [hereinafter Kaiser, Summary of the Affordable Care Act],
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2011/04/8061-021.pdf.
26. Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & the Uninsured, Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., The
Coverage Gap: Uninsured Poor Adults in States that Do Not Expand Medicaid 2 (2014),
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2014/04/8505-the-coverage-gap_uninsuredpoor-adults-in-states-that-do-not-expand-medicaid.pdf.
27. 132 S. Ct. at 2608.
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a suit filed against the HHS, the Treasury, and the Labor Departments and their
Secretaries.28 The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the individual
mandate,29 but it concurrently ruled that the federal government is limited in its
ability to pressure state acceptance of the new Medicaid provisions outlined by
the PPACA.30 The Court reasoned that the Tenth Amendment coercion doctrine
prevents Congress from using undue financial influence to force state officials
to administer federally conceived programs.31 The narrow holding of the Court
struck down only provisions of the PPACA that conditioned federal funding
for states’ existing Medicaid programs on states’ agreement to participate in the
expansion.32 While the government can terminate new Medicaid funds when states
refuse to comply with the law’s new provisions, it cannot withhold the states’
existing Medicaid funds to manipulate them into adopting the PPACA’s Medicaid
expansion. Medicaid expansion guidelines under the PPACA will still affect states
that choose to participate, and there is a huge incentive for states to do so due to
the federal funding involved.33 A majority of state governors support the Medicaid
expansion. As of September 2014, twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia
are implementing Medicaid eligibility determinations that comply with new federal
requirements; three other states are considering expansion.34
The Medicaid expansion is linked to the individual mandate in that
individuals who do not qualify for Medicaid will be required to maintain “minimum
essential” health insurance coverage through an employer or government program
or by independent purchase from a private company.35 The intention behind the
28. Id. at 2566.
29. Id. at 2601.
30. Id. at 2607.
31. Id. at 2602–07 (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)).
32. Id. at 2607–08; see also Sara Rosenbaum & Timothy M. Westmoreland, The Supreme
Court’s Surprising Decision on the Medicaid Expansion: How Will the Federal Government
and States Proceed?, 31 Health Aff. 1663, 1665–66 (2012).
33. See, e.g., Michelle Greenhalgh, Am. Acad. of Family Physicians, The Affordable
Care Act: Medicaid Expansion & Healthcare Exchanges 6, http://www.aafp.org/dam/AAFP/
documents/advocacy/coverage/aca/ES-MedicaidExpansion.pdf (“If a state does choose to
expand its Medicaid program under the ACA, the federal government will fully fund Medicaid coverage for newly eligible individuals . . . through 2016.”); Robert Pear, Uncertainty
Over States and Medicaid Expansion, N.Y. Times (June 28, 2012), http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/06/29/us/uncertainty-over-whether-states-will-choose-to-expand-medicaid.html
(“Senator Max Baucus, Democrat of Montana and a principal author of the new law, said the
federal government was offering states ‘a big juicy carrot’ as an incentive to expand Medicaid.”).
34. Where the States Stand on Medicaid Expansion, Advisory Board Company (Sept. 4,
2014), http://www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/resources/primers/medicaidmap.
35. Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., HHS Final Rule and Treasury Notices on Individual Shared Responsibility Provision Exemptions, Minimum Essential Coverage,
and Related Topics (June 26, 2013), http://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/
Fact-Sheets/2013-Fact-Sheets-Items/2013-06-26.html.
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requirement is to stabilize insurance pools by increasing the participation of healthy
individuals.36 On August 27, 2013, the Treasury Department and Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) released the final rules for the individual mandate and “shared
responsibility payment” authorized by Internal Revenue Code § 5000A and Section
1501 of the PPACA37:
Starting in 2014, the individual shared responsibility provision calls
for each individual to have basic health insurance coverage (known
as minimum essential coverage), qualify for an exemption,38 or
make a shared responsibility payment when filing a federal income
tax return. Individuals will not have to make a payment if coverage
is unaffordable, if they spend less than three consecutive months
without coverage, or if they qualify for an exemption for several
other reasons, including hardship and religious beliefs.39
An individual earning above 400% of the FPL is deemed unable to afford coverage
if the required contribution to purchase coverage exceeds 8% of the individual’s
household income.40 HHS also automatically exempts from the individual mandate
persons who are ineligible for Medicaid based solely on a state’s decision not to
implement the Medicaid expansion.41
Individuals who do not qualify for Medicaid or fit within an exemption
to the individual mandate requirement will be required to maintain minimum
36. Timothy Jost, Implementing Health Reform: Final IRS Individual Mandate Regulations, Health Aff. Blog (Aug. 28, 2013, 7:14 AM), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2013/08/28/
implementing-health-reform-final-irs-individual-mandate-regulations/.
37. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501, 124 Stat. 119,
244–49 (2010) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 5000A (2012)).
38. There are nine categories of individuals who qualify for an exemption: (1) “individuals
who cannot afford coverage,” (2) “individuals with household income below the filing threshold,” (3) “members of federally recognized Indian tribes,” (4) “individuals who experience
a hardship,” (5) “individuals who experience a short coverage gap,” (6) “members of certain
religious sects,” (7) “members of a health care sharing ministry,” (8) “incarcerated individuals,” and (9) “individuals who are not lawfully present.” Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare &
Medicaid Servs., supra note 35.
39. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of the Treasury, Fact Sheet: Individual Shared Responsibility for Health Insurance Coverage and Minimum Essential Coverage Final Rules (Aug. 27,
2013), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2152.aspx; see also Treas.
Reg. §§ 1.5000A-1 to -4 (2013) (interpreting the minimum essential coverage and shared
responsibility payment provisions).
40. Sarah Kliff, Readers Have Questions About Obamacare’s Penalties. We Have Answers!,
Wash. Post Wonkblog (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/
wp/2013/04/01/readers-have-questions-about-obamacares-penalties-we-have-answers/.
41. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of the Treasury, supra note 39.
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essential coverage (MEC).42 MEC includes government-sponsored coverage, an
employer-sponsored plan, individual coverage, grandfathered coverage, and other
coverage expressly defined as MEC.43 The PPACA establishes regulated online
marketplaces, administered by either the federal or state governments, where
individuals and small businesses can purchase private insurance plans.44 The
online marketplaces provide subsidies for low-income enrollees.45 Individuals
with incomes between 100% and 400% of the FPL46 who purchase insurance
plans through a marketplace exchange will be eligible to receive federal subsidies
to help pay premium costs.47 A recent analysis by the Congressional Budget Office
found that individuals with incomes between 250% and 300% of the FPL will
receive subsidies sufficient to cover 42% of the cost of the second-lowest-cost
plan, while individuals with incomes at 350% to 400% of the FPL will receive
subsidies sufficient to cover just 13% of their premiums.48
States, the HHS, and the Department of the Treasury all play a role in
implementing the PPACA’s eligibility requirements.49 The Centers for Medicare
& Medicaid Services (CMS) is responsible for implementing Medicaid eligibility
changes mandated by the PPACA; “providing guidance, grant funding, and other
assistance to the states; overseeing enrollment provisions . . . ; and providing
performance bonuses to states that meet or exceed specified Medicaid enrollment
goals.”50 The IRS oversees the tax-related provisions of the PPACA and issues
regulations relevant to implementing eligibility rules for the premium tax credit.51

42. Kaiser, Summary of the Affordable Care Act, supra note 25, at 1.
43. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.5000A-2 (2013) (defining minimum essential coverage).
44. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1311, 124 Stat. 119,
173–81 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2012)) (establishing voluntary exchanges).
The PPACA requires that an exchange be “a governmental agency or nonprofit entity” that
facilitates the purchase of health insurance. § 1311, 124 Stat. at 176–78 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 18031(d)).
45. See Premium Subsidies – What You Need to Know, Am.’s Health Ins. Plans Coverage
(Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.ahipcoverage.com/2013/02/07/premium-subsidies-what-you-needto-know/.
46. See generally Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 79 Fed. Reg. 3593 (Jan.
22, 2014).
47. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA): Long Term Costs for Governments,
Employers, Families and Providers 12–13 (Lewin Grp., Staff Working Paper No. 11, 2010),
http://www.lewin.com/~/media/Lewin/Site_Sections/Publications/LewinGroupAnalysis-PatientProtectionandAffordableCareAct2010.pdf.
48. Premium Subsidies – What You Need to Know, supra note 45.
49. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-12-648, Children’s Health Insurance: Opportunities Exist for Improved Access to Affordable Insurance 3 (2012).
50. Id.
51. Id.
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Problems and Solutions Within the PPACA’s MAGI Test

Medicaid eligibility under the PPACA hinges on a calculation called “modified
adjusted gross income” (MAGI), which is the sum of the taxpayer’s “adjusted gross
income” (AGI), as determined under federal income tax calculations,52 and any taxexempt interest or foreign income received.53 As opposed to the previous eligibility
standards set by individual states, the new federal standard does not consider an
individual’s assets.54 Supporters of the new standard view the AGI-based MAGI
test as preferable in its simplification and ease of verification.55
While MAGI is intended to simplify the administration of the Medicaid
program, it also creates arbitrary distinctions in the treatment of individuals with
similar incomes slightly above and below the eligibility threshold and allows the
prioritization of asset-wealthy individuals over their more needy counterparts. This
outcome runs counter to the Medicaid program’s intentions, and asset tests and
cost considerations should be incorporated into Medicaid eligibility requirements
to ensure that Medicaid funds are reserved for individuals most in need.
A. MAGI’s Cliff-like Cap on Medicaid Eligibility Creates a Harsh and
Arbitrary Cutoff
The PPACA imposes uniform qualifications that states must use in
determining Medicaid eligibility to qualify for expanded federal funding.56 These
new regulations extend Medicaid coverage to all individuals between ages nineteen
and sixty-four whose incomes fall below 133% of the FPL,57 a figure that works out
52.
53.

I.R.C. § 62 (2012).
Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & the Uninsured, Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Explaining Health Reform: The New Rules for Determining Income Under Medicaid in 2014,
at 1 (2011) [hereinafter Kaiser, New Rules for Determining Income Under Medicaid in
2014], http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8194.pdf.
54. Kip Piper, Medicaid Expansion: Briefing for Medicaid Health Plans of America,
Medicaid Health Plans Am. 29 (June 15, 2010), http://www.mhpa.org/_upload/SDwebinarJune2010.pdf.
55. Id.
56. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012); Kaiser, New
Rules for Determining Income Under Medicaid in 2014, supra note 53, at 1–2.
57. “This income limit includes a five percentage point of income disregard that raises the
effective limit to 138% FPL from 133% FPL.” Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & the Uninsured, Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Medicaid Eligibility for Adults as of January 1,
2014, at 4 n.1 (2013), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/10/8497medicaid-eligibility-for-adults-as-of-january-1-2014.pdf; see also Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2002, 124 Stat. 119, 281 (2010) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(e)(14) (2012)) (establishing rules for determining income eligibility); Ctrs.
for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Medicaid Expansion & What It Means for You, Healthcare.
gov, https://www.healthcare.gov/what-if-my-state-is-not-expanding-medicaid/ (Sept. 26,
2014) (explaining differences in eligibility in relation to state Medicaid expansion).
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to be $16,105 for an individual and $32,913 for a family of four in 2014.58 MAGI is a
strict cutoff; everyone below the line is eligible to reap full Medicaid benefits, while
everyone above the line is not.59 Federal eligibility standards are simply minimum
baselines; thus, Medicaid eligibility for adults with incomes above those standards
varies greatly between states depending on additional discretionary state funding.60
This strict cutoff creates significant administrative issues. Many people in the
Medicaid population “hover close to the qualifying line for eligibility” and will “cross[]
back and forth over the line over the course of a year.”61 Determining eligibility status
and coordinating health benefits for this population is an administrative challenge.62
The population is not small; an estimated 35% of adults will experience a change in
eligibility within six months on these grounds, and 50% within one year.63 The clifflike cutoff compromises the fairness of Medicaid administration by removing nuance
from considerations of equity and need. Income is only one component of wealth
and, conversely, need. Slightly increasing the complexity of Medicaid eligibility
determinations and benefit distributions would be justified by achieving more accurate
allocation of benefits to those who need them most.
To counteract the arbitrary results of a black-and-white cutoff for Medicaid
eligibility, the government should employ a phaseout rather than a cliff cutoff with
potential subsidies for non-qualifiers.64 A phaseout gradually reduces a taxpayer’s
eligibility for a certain benefit as the taxpayer approaches a certain income limit.65
58. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Income Levels that Qualify for Lower Health
Coverage Costs, Healthcare.gov, https://www.healthcare.gov/how-can-i-save-money-onmarketplace-coverage/ (Sept. 26, 2014).
59. See Bernadette Fernandez, Cong. Research Serv., R41137, Health Insurance Premium Credits in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) 4–6 (2014).
60. See Renée M. Landers & Patrick A. Leeman, Medicaid Expansion Under the 2010
Health Care Reform Legislation: The Continuing Evolution of Medicaid’s Central Role in
American Health Care, NAELA J., Spring 2011, at 143, 147.
61. Id. at 159 (citing Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & the Uninsured, Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Coordinating Coverage and Care in Medicaid and Health Insurance Exchanges
2 (2010), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8118.pdf).
62. See id.
63. Id. (citing Benjamin D. Sommers & Sara Rosenbaum, Issues in Health Reform: How
Changes in Eligibility May Move Millions Back and Forth Between Medicaid and Insurance
Exchanges, 30 Health Aff. 228, 235 (2011)).
64. Cf. Staff of J. Comm. on Taxation, 108th Cong., Description of Revenue Provisions
Contained in the President’s Fiscal Year 2005 Budget Proposal 186 (J. Comm. Print 2004)
(“Eliminating the disqualified investment income test eliminates the cliff effect that can deny
an EIC to a taxpayer merely because he or she has an additional dollar of investment income.
However, the cliff effect could be addressed by implementing a phaseout rule so that the
credit is reduced as investment income exceeds certain amounts.”).
65. See Roberton Williams, Tax Pol’y Center, The Tax Policy Briefing Book: A Citizens’ Guide for the 2012 Election and Beyond 6–7 (2011), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/
upload/Background/I-7IncomeTaxIssues.final.pdf (describing how phaseouts of tax provisions affect taxpayers).
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The IRS has extensive experience implementing phaseout programs because of
their prevalence within the Internal Revenue Code.66 For instance, in applying the
Child Tax Credit, which credits a taxpayer up to $1000 per qualifying child, the
phaseout begins at $110,000 for married taxpayers filing a joint return.67 Taxpayers
with a MAGI falling below this amount can claim the full credit, while taxpayers
with a MAGI above this amount receive gradually reduced credits until the income
phaseout limit is reached.68 “Most phaseouts reduce benefits at a constant rate over
the full phaseout range,” so “the rate depends on the width of the range.”69 Others,
such as the Child Tax Credit, phase out over a certain number of fixed increments.70
The phaseout can be gradual or steep depending on the number of fixed increments
used.71 Most phaseouts are adjusted for inflation so that “phaseout ranges remain
fixed in real terms.”72 Otherwise, inflation would raise nominal incomes and lift
taxpayers out of their appropriate thresholds.73
A Medicaid eligibility phaseout would thus strengthen the relationship
between ability to pay and governmental assistance and would thus promote fair
and just administration of benefits. A phaseout and subsidy serve essentially the
same purpose, but a phaseout that reduces benefits according to an individual’s
health care costs, as a percentage of their ability to pay, is more flexible where
an individual’s income changes sporadically from month-to-month or year-to-year.
Within the subsidy system, individuals might hop in and out of Medicaid based on
income shifts as little as one dollar, whereas the employment of a phaseout system
would produce a less harsh result by linking variances in affordability to different
ratios of cost coverage. Thus, small shifts in income would be more likely to change
the individual’s expected co-pay than their bottom-line eligibility for Medicaid.
The subsidy system is a similar conceptualization but produces jarring results and
confusion. A phaseout designed around affordability also ensures that medically
needy individuals are covered under the PPACA rather than left crippled by high
medical bills they cannot afford despite incomes that are “too high” for Medicaid
eligibility, as the next section will discuss.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

See id.
I.R.C. § 24(a)–(b) (2012).
See id. § 24(b)(1).
Williams, supra note 65, at 6.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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B. MAGI’s Non-Consideration of Cost Exacerbates the Inaccurate
Categorization and Prioritization of Needy Individuals
The PPACA exempts from the mandate and leaves uninsured those
individuals whose coverage would cost more than 8% of their household income.74
Although persons with income between 133% and 400% of the FPL may receive
sliding scale subsidies for purchasing insurance through state exchanges, that
sliding scale is based on income only, and there is currently no federal assistance
available for medically needy individuals who do not qualify for Medicaid and for
whom insurance is unaffordable.75 Taxpayers whose MAGI is too high to qualify
for Medicaid but whose premium or medical costs are likely to be in excess of
8% of their income should receive federal assistance under a health care system
designed to provide comprehensive and affordable coverage.
“Medically needy” assistance programs administered by states prior to the
PPACA traditionally presumed that there are circumstances in which people with
income over the Medicaid eligibility limit may still need help with extremely high
medical expenses.76 In states that formally provide these medically needy programs,
Medicaid coverage “kicks in” once a taxpayer incurs a certain amount of medical
expense during a specific period, called a “spend down.”77 Rather than impose any
kind of federal coverage requirement, the PPACA Medicaid expansion provides a
mere continued option for states that want to continue their preexisting medically
needy programs and “extend Medicaid eligibility to individuals with high medical
expenses whose income exceeds the maximum threshold.”78 Approximately thirtysix states and the District of Columbia have some form of medically needy program,79
and the PPACA exempts these types of programs from the general MAGI eligibility
74. Mark Trumbull, Obama Signs Health Care Bill: Who Won’t Be Covered?, Christian
Sci. Monitor (Mar. 23, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/0323/Obama-signshealth-care-bill-Who-won-t-be-covered.
75. Id. In 2014, an individual with a yearly income of less than $16,105 qualifies for Medicaid, while an individual with a higher income (up to 400% of the FPL) may receive sliding
scale subsidies for insurance premiums. Similarly, a family of four with a yearly income of
less than $32,913 qualifies for Medicaid, while a family earning more may receive subsidies.
See supra text accompanying notes 57–58.
76. Shanna Hanson, Medically Needy: Simple or Complex?, Hum. Arc Blog (Apr. 3, 2013),
http://www.humanarc.com/blog-entries/medically-needy-simple-or-complex/.
77. Id.
78. Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & the Uninsured, Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., The
Medicaid Medically Needy Program: Spending and Enrollment Update 1 (2012) [hereinafter Kaiser, The Medicaid Medically Needy Program], http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.
wordpress.com/2013/01/4096.pdf.
79. Id. at 2 (“As of 2009, 33 states and the District of Columbia had Medicaid medically
needy programs that covered 2.8 million people.”).
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requirements.80 But, because consideration of medical need is absent in the formal
federal standards for Medicaid eligibility as outlined by the PPACA, the contours
of what constitutes medical need can shift from state to state, and states that do not
offer extended assistance based on medical need still leave a number of taxpayers at
the mercy of high and unaffordable medical costs.81 Additionally, states’ respective
abilities to self-finance this type of program are widely disparate due to varying
levels of financial stability, resources, and available staff.82
Cost of health care should be a factor in determining Medicaid eligibility
under the PPACA expansion. Rather than allowing states the option of retaining a
medically needy program that exempts an individual from MAGI requirements, the
federal government should mandate assistance for medically needy individuals. The
retention of optional medically needy programs produces inconsistency between
various state programs and large disparities in treatment of medically needy
populations between states that do and do not offer such programs. The wholly
voluntary nature of the state programs presents a risk that, “rather than incur these
added expenses, states will curtail the scope of covered services, restrict eligibility,
or even withdraw from [providing such a] program altogether.”83
Medically needy individuals can potentially spend a greater proportion of
their income than either Medicaid recipients or those who qualify for low-income
insurance subsidies. Exempting such persons from the individual mandate does
not solve this problem; while some states will provide further assistance to them,
some will not. Additionally, Medicaid under the PPACA works as a priority system:
states must cover people with lower incomes before covering people with higher
incomes, regardless of individual circumstances.84 Incorporation of medical need as
an eligibility factor in the PPACA’s Medicaid expansion would provide consistent
standards throughout states and prevent these truly needy persons from falling
through the cracks in a system striving to provide affordable health care for all.
C. MAGI’s Non-Consideration of Assets Leads to Inaccurate Categorization
and Prioritization of Needy Individuals
Welfare reform in 1996 gave states increased authority over eligibility rules
for Medicaid by decoupling these rules from welfare eligibility rules that required
80. Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & the Uninsured, Henry J. Kaiser Family Found.,
The Affordable Care Act’s Impact on Medicaid Eligibility, Enrollment, and Benefits
for People with Disabilities 5 (2014), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.
com/2014/04/8390-02-the-affordable-care-acts-impact-on-medicaid-eligibility.pdf.
81. See Kaiser, The Medicaid Medically Needy Program, supra note 78, at 2–3.
82. Landers & Leeman, supra note 60, at 160 (citing Leighton Ku, Ready, Set, Plan, Implement: Executing the Expansion of Medicaid, 29 Health Aff. 1173, 1176 (2010)).
83. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2, Atkins v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 154 (1986) (No. 85-632), 1986 WL 727844, at *2.
84. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2001, 124 Stat. 119,
278–79 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(k)(2) (2012)).
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asset examination.85 By March 2011, approximately half of states had eliminated
Medicaid eligibility asset tests as a result of concerns that asset test implementation
was overly burdensome and that asset tests themselves sent troubling policy
messages.86 While the purpose of asset tests is to ensure that programs meant
to benefit low-income people “focus benefits on truly low-income people and
exclude those with limited incomes but substantial assets,”87 states that eliminated
the tests felt that imposing an eligibility asset test was more problematic than
beneficial because asset tests were “expensive to administer,” weeded out “very
few applicants,” and sent the wrong message to families, namely “that they should
not save for their future.”88 Asset tests have continued to gain a reputation as cruel
and unnecessary, steadily becoming more unpopular as the media increasingly
highlights the association between asset tests with very low asset caps and perceived
attempts by Republicans to sabotage poor populations.89 In popular opinion, all
asset testing, even programs with better designs that allow for more significant
savings, has become associated with attempts to untowardly restrict or dismantle
social insurance.
The elimination of asset tests in determining eligibility for Medicaid benefits,
though, weakens the link between neediness and benefit within this means-based
social benefit program. According to the new eligibility requirements for Medicaid
imposed by the PPACA,90 in the scenario presented in the Introduction, Mary will
be eligible to receive federal health care assistance, while Bob will have to purchase
insurance. None of Mary’s forms of wealth or assets constitute gross income under
85. Smith et al., supra note 18, at 1.
86. See Working Families Featured State: Rhode Island, Nat’l Conf. St. Legislatures,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/working-families-featured-state-rhodeisland.aspx (Sept. 26, 2014).
87. Thomas Rice & Katherine A. Desmond, Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Executive
Summary of Low-Income Subsidies for the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit: The Impact
of the Asset Test (2005), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/lowincome-subsidies-for-the-medicare-prescription-drug-benefit-the-impact-of-the-asset-testreport.pdf.
88. Utah Health Pol’y Project, Remove Utah’s Asset Test: Eliminate Barriers to
Self-Sufficiency 1 (2009), http://www.healthpolicyproject.org/Publications_files/Medicaid/
assettestfactsheet6-9-09.pdf.
89. See, e.g., Mike Konczal, The House’s Food Stamps Cuts Aren’t Just Cruel. They’re
Dumb., Wash. Post Wonkblog (Sept. 28, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
wonkblog/wp/2013/09/28/the-houses-food-stamps-cuts-arent-just-cruel-theyre-dumb/; Nicholas Kristof, Op-Ed., Prudence or Cruelty?, N.Y. Times (Nov. 16, 2013), http://www.nytimes.
com/2013/11/17/opinion/sunday/prudence-or-cruelty.html; Laura Pereyra, TANF’s Counterproductive Asset Tests: Eliminating the Tests Will Help Families While Saving States Money,
Center for Am. Progress (May 6, 2010), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/poverty/
news/2010/05/06/7846/tanfs-counterproductive-asset-tests/.
90. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 §§ 2001–2002, 124
Stat. 119, 271–82 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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the current Internal Revenue Code,91 and thus none will be included in determining
her eligibility under the MAGI test.92 This extreme example93 is a clear illustration
of the way individuals with higher wealth may reap Medicaid benefits over needier
populations under a strictly MAGI-based evaluation system that does not consider
assets. The amount of asset wealth a person can retain while still qualifying for
Medicaid benefits is unlimited in theory, and will be unexamined under the new
law. Equally concerning is the possibility that a person’s income may put him or her
over the MAGI eligibility cutoff, when in reality, negative assets and debts render
his or her ability to afford insurance far less than his or her income would suggest.
Student loan debt, for instance, has become staggering, and such outstanding debt
is not included in MAGI-based affordability analysis.94
Instead of eliminating asset tests, the PPACA should include assets as a
factor in determining ability to pay. What popular opinion against asset testing
overlooks is that more appropriate asset tests can prevent potentially egregious
abuses of benefit programs that lessen available funds for the needy and may
even increase enrollment through consideration of negative assets and debts. The
inclusion of asset testing would be more sensitive to individual circumstances like
Mary’s or Bob’s because incorporating positive and negative assets and debts into
an individual’s eligibility profile more accurately portrays whether or not a person
can truly afford health care premiums. This more comprehensive approach to
benefit eligibility may also assist in preventing benefit reductions to enrollees due
to budgetary strain from an unnecessarily overburdened system.95
91. See supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 52–54.
93. In actuality, an individual like Mary with significant cash wealth would be unlikely to
qualify for Medicaid if she kept any of her gift or cash assets in a savings account, since the
interest generated on the high amount would likely be enough to disqualify the individual
from Medicaid eligibility under the MAGI test. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(4) (2012); Treas. Reg. §
1.61-7 (as amended in 1966).
94. E.g., Gary Lapon, Drowning in Student Debt, SocialistWorker.org (Nov. 7, 2011),
http://socialistworker.org/2011/11/07/drowning-in-student-debt; Naomi Schaefer Riley,
‘Predator’ Student Loans, N.Y. Post (Jul. 23, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://nypost.com/2013/07/23/
predator-student-loans/ (“Young people across America are putting off marriage and starting a
family because they’re so weighed down by the collective $1 trillion in accumulated student
debt.”).
95. See, e.g., Andrew G. Biggs, Means Testing and Its Limits, Nat’l Aff., Fall 2011, at 97,
111–12; Deborah Moldover, Note, An Analysis of the Federal Medicaid Statute’s Spousal
Anti-Impoverishment Provision in Light of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s
Medicaid Expansion and Current Federal Budgetary Constraints, Annals Health L. Advance
Directive, Spring 2013, at 168 n.62, http://www.luc.edu/media/lucedu/law/centers/healthlaw/
pdfs/advancedirective/pdfs/issue10/moldover.pdf (“The number of Medicaid enrollees has
been steadily increasing nationally, coinciding with a growth in the overall amount of Medicaid spending. While the growth has not been linear, it is logical to conclude that reducing the
number of potential beneficiaries would lead to some reduction in Medicaid spending.”).
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There are a number of ways to design an appropriate asset test that does not
implicate the aforementioned public policy concerns. Exemption of certain types of
assets with reasonable capped values is one way to address this issue.96 Another is
to raise the total net amount of allowable assets. The third approach is an extension
of the second. Although a full discussion of the third option exceeds the scope of
this Note, the idea is worth mentioning both for its novelty and political import.
In fiscal year 2011 budget discussions, President Obama proposed imposing
a uniform $10,000 asset limit for all federally funded means-tested programs serving
low-income adults and their families.97 The uniformity of such an asset limit would
make the application process clear and encourage savings by providing a reasonable,
consistent, and clear asset limit for all public assistance programs. Separating the
administration of similarly purposed social benefits programs creates situations
where several agencies might be tasked with performing analogous duties, which
leads to waste and confuses program beneficiaries who must navigate each related
program’s distinct rules and requirements. The limit proposed by President Obama
would relieve administrative burden by fostering coordination between programs
and shifting all social benefits toward coordinated eligibility criteria.98
Streamlined rules would improve cross-program coordination and promote
better access to public benefits of all types. Families would be able to accumulate
a modest amount of savings while still qualifying for assistance, and those without
additional significant assets would qualify for care before wealthier individuals.
Allowing these savings would remove the disincentive for families to save and
build assets, as well as help families withstand crises such as job loss, health
emergencies, or transportation issues.

96. Cf. Lynn M. LoPucki & Elizabeth Warren, Secured Credit: A Systems Approach
14–16 (5th ed. 2006) (explaining the concept of foreclosure exemption statutes, which exist
in all fifty states and prevent seizing certain property in foreclosure, such as houses, cars, consumer goods, and business property below certain values); Kerry A. Ryan, Access Assured:
Restoring Progressivity in the Tax and Spending Programs for Higher Education, 38 Seton
Hall L. Rev. 1, 17–18 (2008) (discussing calculation of the expected family contribution in a
student aid context and exemptions for home equity and retirement accounts).
97. Rebecca Vallas & Joe Valenti, Ctr. for Am. Progress, Asset Limits Are a Barrier
to Economic Security and Mobility 5 (2014), http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/
uploads/2014/09/Asset_Limits_Brief.pdf; see also Supplemental Security Income Restoration
Act of 2014, S. 2089, 113th Cong. (proposing an increase in asset limits for the Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) program, from $2,000 to $10,000 for unmarried individuals). Studies have suggested that the limit could or should be even higher, but the concept remains the
same. See, e.g., Children & Family Servs. Admin., Minn. Dep’t of Human Servs., Report on
Uniform Asset Limit Requirements 5–6 (2013), http://cfed.org/assets/pdfs/Uniform_Asset_
Limit_Requirements_Report_Final.pdf (analyzing a proposed program under both a $10,000
and $20,000 asset limit).
98. See infra text accompanying note 108.
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A Better Way to Expand Medicaid: Medicaid Eligibility Should
Function Similarly to Student Aid Eligibility & EFC Should
Serve as a Model Calculation Methodology

In order to adequately address the problems discussed above, Medicaid
eligibility considerations should mirror those of certain other federal aid programs
where contributions are determined by need. One extremely practical model for
comparison is federal student aid eligibility. Student eligibility for Pell Grant and
subsidized loan programs under Title IV is determined on the basis of financial
need calculated by a formula that considers the cost of attendance less the student’s
expected family contribution (EFC), which is the federal government’s measure
of a family’s ability to pay postsecondary education expenses out of their own
resources.99 The first step in calculating EFC is to determine a family’s available
income, which is gross income less certain allowances.100 EFC is similar to MAGI
in this regard. Unlike MAGI, EFC then goes on to add a parental contribution
based on asset wealth, while excluding certain assets from consideration.101 Assets
includable in EFC are “the current balance of checking and savings accounts and
cash on hand; the net value of investments and real estate, excluding the net value
of the principal place of residence; and the adjusted net worth of a business or
farm.”102 EFC also takes negative assets into account,103 which guards against
overestimating a family’s ability to pay where their assets have depreciated or they
are saddled with significant debt obligations.
In 2008, the Congressional Research Service found that administrative
functions represent about 5% of total Medicaid program expenditures, a fraction
of what private insurers spend on plan administration.104 Because administrating
Medicaid involves much more than determining eligibility based on MAGI, it is
unlikely that the intended simplification will dramatically affect administrative
costs. For instance, the PPACA includes means-testing provisions for premium
99. Ryan, supra note 96, at 16 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1087mm (2000)).
100. Id. at 17.
101. Id.
102. 20 U.S.C. § 1087oo(d)(2) (2012).
103. 20 U.S.C. § 1087vv(g) (2012).
104. Compare April Grady, Cong. Research Serv., RS22101, State Medicaid Program
Administration: A Brief Overview 3 (2008), with Gary Dorrien, The Obama Question: A
Progressive Perspective 117 (2012) (“[O]verhead costs for self-insured large companies are 5
to 10 percent of premiums; HMOs range between 15 and 25 percent; companies in the small
group market average 26 percent; and individual insurance averages 40 percent of premiums.”). But see Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1001,
124 Stat. 119, 137 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18 (2012)) (requiring insurance
companies offering coverage in the small group or individual market to spend at least 80% of
premium dollars on medical care and those in the large group market to spend at least 85% of
premium dollars on medical care).

141

Spring 2015

		

Assets, Costs, and Affordability

structures under the Medicare prescription drug benefit program.105 Administrators
are thus tasked with making ongoing income-based eligibility determinations,
subsidy determinations, and exemption investigations, while maintaining an
average administrative cost of 3% of Medicare program expenditures.106 In some
states, the new MAGI test will actually increase health officials’ workloads. In
Texas, for instance, the Health and Human Services Commission believes that
health officials’ workloads will be increased because applicants for Medicaid are
also evaluated for the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and the
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program (TANF), which are unaffected
by the PPACA and continue to consider assets.107 In such cases, the state’s decision
to participate in the PPACA’s Medicaid expansion turns a once single-process
evaluation of assets and wealth into a multi-process evaluation.
Consider how this approach might apply to our old friends, Mary and Bob.
If Medicaid worked like student aid, when undertaking an evaluation of assistance
eligibility, the reviewer would begin by exempting a standard amount of Bob or
Mary’s income and assets from consideration.108 Certain additional types of assets
might be categorically excluded from consideration—529 college savings accounts
and the value of a primary residence, farm, or small business are all, for instance,
excluded from the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) ability-topay calculations.109 The net worth of the remaining income and assets would be
compared to the estimated cost of the individual’s health care. If the individual’s net
worth was lower than a certain amount, or if the ratio of his or her health care costs
to net worth exceeded a certain percentage, he or she would be eligible for Medicaid
assistance. Because of the phaseout, an individual with greater need would be 100%
covered while an individual just over the eligibility line would likely be expected
to provide a co-pay. Under these guidelines, it’s difficult to imagine a scenario in
which Mary could ever qualify for Medicaid assistance ahead of Bob.
Conclusion
By expanding the Medicaid program to provide greater access to health care
services for low-income people, the PPACA takes a giant step towards providing
affordable health care access to all U.S. citizens. However, the PPACA faces many
105. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3308, 124 Stat. at 472–75 (codified 42
U.S.C. § 1395w-113 (2012)).
106. Dorrien, supra note 104, at 117.
107. Lyndsay Knecht, Texans Applying for Medicaid Will Be Judged Only on Income, Not Assets, Kera News (July 31, 2013, 9:15 AM), http://keranews.org/post/texans-applying-medicaidwill-be-judged-only-income-not-assets.
108. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087oo (2012).
109. Id. § 1087oo(d); William Baldwin, Paying for College: How the Financial Aid Formulas Work, Forbes (Feb. 28, 2013, 12:04 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/baldwin/2013/02/28/
college-aid-formulas-fafsa-profile-and-consensus/.
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substantial legal, political, and practical hurdles, including wrangling with how
best to achieve its goals. Some of these goals require more long-term analysis, but
the effects of other implementation decisions can be more clearly forecasted. An
individual’s ability to afford marketplace products like health care depends on more
than just income. MAGI should be a factor in determining Medicaid eligibility, but
it should not be the sole point of determination. Delivering adequate and widereaching health care benefits to impoverished populations is a goal that will be
better served if eligibility is determined by a figure that considers income, assets,
and costs to more accurately reflect an individual’s ability to afford health care
costs within their comprehensive life circumstances. Such an approach will produce
more accurate, fairer results for people with high medical costs or debt and better
propel the PPACA toward its goal of delivering health insurance to all citizens at a
cost they can truly afford.
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